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AbsTRAcT
In Debating Brain Drain, Brock and Blake (2015) discuss the pros and cons 
of high-skill mobility prevention to curb the brain drain from developing 
countries from a legal and political perspective. I complement this 
discussion with the insights from recent economic research on brain drain, 
globalization, and development. Two main results are emphasized: the 
fact that educational investments are higher when high-skill migration is 
not constrained, and the role of skilled diasporas in promoting the 
integration of migrants’ home countries into the global economy. Both 
results strengthen the rationale for letting skilled people go.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Gillian Brock and Michael Blake’s (2015) book Debating Brain Drain: May 
Governments Restrict Emigration? discusses and offers a new perspective 
on an idea put forth in liberal political theory and international human 
rights law, namely that emigration is a fundamental human right and shall 
therefore not be questioned. The book is split into two parts arguing for 
and against the possibility for developing countries to impose restrictions 
on emigration to remedy their losses incurred through the “brain drain” 
(that is, the emigration of highly-skilled workers). Brock argues that the 
governments of developing countries may impose temporary restrictions 
on emigration when they experience net losses from the loss of their skilled 
workers whereas Blake argues against such restrictions. However, both 
authors agree that “that despite a huge range of benefits that accrue to 
1  This short essay draws largely on joint work with Frederic Docquier (Docquier and 
Rapoport: 2012a, 2012b). See also Gibson and McKenzie (2011) for an overview of the brain 
drain literature.
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countries of origin, there are some cases in which net losses may be 
occurring” (Brock and Blake 2015: 42). 
While I will not disagree with the statement that some countries 
experience losses from high-skilled emigration, I disagree with Brock’s 
policy conclusion of putting restrictive laws into place that discourage the 
emigration of the highly-skilled. In this article, I will argue from an 
economic standpoint that we should not take the notion of “brain drain” as 
the only dimension there is to the emigration of the highly-skilled. Once 
we establish a positive or “brain effect” of high-skill emigration (and we 
will, with the help of a number of theoretical and empirical economic 
papers), the normative and economic argument for the restriction of 
emigration will partly collapse as home countries can actually benefit 
from the emigration of their most talented representatives. I posit that 
there are dynamic and long-term effects of high skilled emigration that 
work through indirect channels to benefit the countries of origin, for 
instance through international trade and investment, social remittances, 
and incentive schemes for the ones left behind. Even if some countries may 
suffer net losses from the emigration of highly-skilled individuals, I argue 
that instead of limiting the “drain effect” through the prohibition of 
emigration, one should rather foster the “brain effect” by putting 
institutions into place that reinforce the benefits of emigration. 
2. SHOULD WE TAX (OR BAN) THE BRAIN DRAIN?
Forty years ago, the great international economist Jagdish Bhagwati 
proposed to institute a “tax on brains” to curb the brain drain from 
developing to economically advanced countries. Himself a member of the 
super highly-skilled Indian academic diaspora, a graduate from Cambridge 
University and then a Professor at MIT, and then at Columbia University, 
he was well placed to reflect on his personal experience to write on the 
topic. His proposal, now known as the “Bhagwati tax” proposal, was at 
odds at the time with his otherwise very neo-classical views on free trade 
but well in the spirit of the New International Economic Order that was 
gaining momentum in the 1970s in many political, civil society, and 
academic circles.
The very principle of a tax on brains rests on the notion that origin 
countries should be compensated for the loss of human capital incurred as 
a result of the brain drain. The compensators should be those who gain 
from the move, that is, the high-skill emigrant herself and the receiving 
country that will enjoy the return from that human capital, reaping the 
benefits from an investment financed by others. It is in line with the more 
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radical view that brain drain is a form of neo-colonialism whereby the 
economically advanced countries keep depriving developing countries of 
their resources, a modern form of spoliation. And human capital may 
indeed be the scarcest resource of all for developing countries, one whose 
outmigration may seriously damage the growth and development 
prospects of the migrants’ home countries. This negative and pessimistic 
view of the brain drain (the term itself is quite pejorative) is well 
summarized in the following citation from Michael Todaro’s popular 
development economics textbook, a must read for any undergraduate 
students in economic development studies:
“The irony of international migration today is that many of the 
people who migrate legally from poor to richer lands are the very 
ones that Third World countries can least afford to lose: the highly 
educated and skilled. Since the great majority of these migrants 
move on a permanent basis, this perverse brain drain not only 
represents a loss of valuable human resources but could prove to be 
a serious constraint on the future economic progress of Third World 
nations” (Todaro 1996: 119).
It is noteworthy that the above citation, taken from the 5th edition of the 
textbook, was still present in the 10th edition nearly 20 years later. This 
shows that the dominant view about brain drain and development has not 
evolved so much in spite of the fact that the last 20 years have seen a boom 
in economics research on brain drain and development which is much 
more balanced than the overwhelmingly negative literature of the 1970s 
and 1980s. Before I briefly review this more recent literature, let me first say 
that the economic case for or against the brain drain has important policy 
implications. To the same extent that the presumption of losses for the 
origin countries served as background justification for policy proposals to 
curb the brain drain through, say, a Bhagwati tax in the 1970s, the same 
presumption serves as a justification today for limiting the free movement 
of highly-skilled professionals originating from certain developing 
countries. These limits range from unilateral sanctions imposed by home-
country governments on those who would fail to return early enough (such 
as removal of citizenship, imposing military conscription on returnees —
or putting them in jail for deserting) to host countries forbidding the 
recruitment of highly-skilled professionals from certain countries. A 
famous example is the ban on recruitment of health professionals from 
Africa enacted by the British authorities in the mid-2000s.
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3. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR ALL BUT THE 
HIGHLY-SKILLED?
There are many reasons to oppose restricting the free movement of people 
in general, and the fact that one is highly-skilled should not create an 
exception. Imposing restrictions on entry is widely accepted even though 
one’s birthplace explains two-thirds to three-quarters of global inequality 
(that is, within-country inequality generated by differences in education, 
experience, gender, race, family background, etc., accounts for only one 
quarter to one-third of total inequality in the world, the rest being due to 
differences in income per capita across countries). It is difficult to reconcile 
the basic fact that international movements are heavily constrained with 
any notion of global justice. For one thing, if we were to decide on the rules 
governing international migration under a veil of ignorance, it seems 
obvious to me that we would opt, if not for open borders, at least for borders 
which would be much more open than we currently experience. We should 
also recall that 200 years ago, at the onset of the industrial revolution, the 
ratio of income per capita between the richest and the poorest country in 
the world was about 2 or 3. It is now orders of magnitude higher, closer to 
100 (in Purchasing Power Parity!). This explosion of inequality between 
countries has been accompanied by the introduction of passports, visas, 
and all kinds of restrictions on people’s free movement, exactly at a time 
when the incentives to migrate became stronger.
Even if we abstract from considerations of global justice and tolerate 
that countries impose restrictions on immigration, it does not follow that 
they can impose restrictions on exit, that is, on emigration. Other contrib-
utors in this symposium will be able to discuss better than I can the legal 
and normative foundations for the right to emigrate; and indeed, restric-
tions on emigration have only been imposed on a large scale in dictator-
ships and authoritarian regimes such as the former Communist countries 
of Europe, or, in the more recent past, in Cuba, China, Iran, and North Korea. 
It is not morally and legally equivalent to build a wall to prevent people from 
coming in or to prevent them from going out.  And again, justifying such 
restrictions —or giving them a hand —because the people under consider-
ation have valuable skills does not resist serious examination. States are 
not residual claimants of one’s human capital. And what do we know about 
the personal motives and circumstances that lead people to emigrate? 
Should it make a difference if someone wants to emigrate because of wage 
differentials or out of fear of persecution in her home country? Should it 
make a difference if that person is a medical doctor from Ethiopia, an en-
gineer from Bolivia, or a nurse from the Philippines?
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While I believe that the policy debate should take seriously the rights of 
individual migrants rather than focusing exclusively on the losses to origin 
countries (that is the debate should also be a principled one), I note that 
the losses for the origin countries still serve as underlying justification for 
restrictive policies. In the rest of this article, therefore, I focus on that 
particular aspect of the debate. The line of argument I want to propose is 
the following: the brain drain is not necessarily a curse for developing 
countries but could be an opportunity. The presumption among the 
general public and among policymakers may still be that the brain drain is 
bad, but the evidence is that it is not, at least in most cases. Let’s see why.
4. THERE IS MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: BRAIN DRAIN 
AND HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES
The traditional (and still widely shared) view of the brain drain is that it is 
depriving home countries of part of their human capital, which is essential 
for growth. To discuss this idea let me use the metaphor of a cake (the 
country’s stock of human capital), with the brain drain being equivalent to 
cutting a piece of the cake (say a quarter) and sending it abroad —hence 
the loss. In terms of sheer loss this view neglects two things. First, those 
abroad form a diaspora which can keep interacting with the home country 
in many economically useful ways. I will discuss diaspora links in the next 
section. And second, this view fails to ask how the cake was made. The 
truth, however, is that the size of the initial cake, the one from which the 
piece is taken, is bigger when there are more emigration options. Or, in 
economists’ jargon, the stock of human capital is endogenous to migration. 
The brain drain may in fact consist in cutting a piece of the human capital 
cake, but from a bigger cake than the one that would exist if there were no 
brain drain. Overall, it is not obvious which effect dominates: the incentive 
effect (increases in size of the cake due to the existence of emigration 
options —let’s call this the brain effect), or the exit effect (decreases due to 
emigration —let’s call this the drain effect). Under certain conditions that 
have been well specified theoretically and verified empirically in a wide 
range of studies, the brain drain could in fact result in a brain gain.
The theoretical intuition is best explained through simple numerical 
examples.2 Assume the following data: individuals in a developing country 
can either be “skilled” (if they invest in a certain education program) or 
2  Early theoretical contributions include Mountford (1997), Vidal (1998), Stark et al. 
(1998) and Docquier and Rapoport (1999).
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unskilled (if they don’t). The wage for an unskilled worker is, say, 1,000, and 
for a skilled worker 5,000. Based on the costs of acquiring education (which 
includes forgone wages during the first period, the direct costs of schooling, 
etc.), a certain number of people, say 10 percent of the population, make 
that investment. Now assume that for skilled workers only, there is a certain 
probability, say 20 percent, of emigration to a high-wage destination where 
skilled workers can obtain a wage of 30,000. The expected wage for a high-
skill worker is now equal to 80 percent of the domestic wage plus 20 percent 
of the foreign wage, that is to 10,000. In other words, it is now doubled 
thanks to the opportunity of emigration. Based on this, we can expect that 
some people who will invest in education would otherwise not have done 
so without the possibility of enjoying a higher return on their human 
capital abroad. How big is this incentive effect, and can it be strong enough 
to dominate the brain drain effect? To continue the numerical example, if 
the proportion of people who invest in education rises to 15 percent, and if 
we still assume that 20 percent of them leave, there would be more educated 
people in the country than had the economy been closed to migration. Is 
this just a theoretical possibility, or a real one? Well, the empirical studies 
that have tried to answer this question tend to support the brain gain (or 
beneficial brain drain) hypothesis. This holds true both for the studies 
using cross-country comparisons and for country case studies.
The main cross-country study is a paper I have co-authored with Michel 
Beine and Frederic Docquier (2008).3 We proceed in two steps: we first 
estimate the elasticity of human capital to skilled emigration, measuring 
how emigration prospects for the highly-skilled affect gross human capital 
formation in home countries, controlling for past human capital levels and 
a series of country-characteristics. In this paper, we also account for the 
fact that there may be a feedback effect from human capital formation 
back to skilled emigration prospects with an Instrumental Variable 
Approach.4 We find a point-estimate of around 5 percent, that is, doubling 
the propensity of emigration for the highly-skilled (people with college 
education or more) generates an increase in the pre-migration stock of 
human capital of 5 percent.
3  See Beine et al. (2008) and its extension in Beine et al. (2010).
4  If there is not only an effect of skilled emigration prospects on human capital 
formation, but there is also a reverse direction of causality from human capital formation on 
migration prospects, or if emigration and human capital formation are jointly driven by 
third, unobserved (omitted) variables, we call this “endogeneity”. In order to disentangle 
the first effect from the second and address the omitted variable problem, we use an 
Instrumental Variable Approach. It consists in predicting the variable of interest, emigration, 
using variables that have no independent effect on the dependent variable, human capital 
formation; that is, that presumably only affect human capital formation through their 
impact on skilled emigration prospects.
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In a second step we then use that point-estimate to compute the net 
gains or losses for all the countries of our sample (which consists of 127 
developing countries). For this we need to proceed with a counterfactual 
simulation. Again, this is best illustrated through a numerical example. 
Assume a country with a population normalized to 100 people, out of 
whom 20 are educated and 80 are not. Let us further assume that emigration 
rates are 1/2 for the educated (50 percent) and 1/8 for the uneducated, that 
is, emigration propensities are higher for the educated by a factor of 4 (in 
the theoretical example above, the emigration propensity of non-educated 
workers was implicitly normalized to zero). After emigration, the country 
is left with 10 educated (as 10 out of 20 have emigrated) and 70 non-educated 
(as 10 out of 80 have emigrated). Has that county lost or gained from the 
brain drain, given what we know about the incentive effect?
Let us denote by H
a
 the ex-ante stock of human capital, before migration 
takes place. This is something we can observe and which in our case equals 
to 20 percent (then H
a
 = 0.2). The ex-post stock of human capital, after 
emigration is netted out, is also observed and in our case equals to 10/80 
(then H
p
 = 0.125). But what would have been the country’s stock of human 
capital if there had been no emigration? To answer the question we do the 
following counterfactual simulation: the counterfactual stock of human 
capital, H
cf









)5, where a is the elasticity of human capital to emigration 




 are the respective emigration propensities 
of skilled and unskilled workers. With our numerical example and point-
estimate for the elasticity, this gives: H
cf
 = 0.2 —0.05.ln(4)=0.13. That is, the 
counterfactual stock of human capital without emigration in our virtual 
economy would have been 13 percent. This means that it has lost half a 
percentage point (or 4 percent) of its human capital because of the brain 
drain, and not 20 percent, as one would think if we were not factoring in 
the fact the human capital formation is partly determined by emigration 
prospects.
When turning to real data, we found that there are more losing than 
winning countries and that the losers tend to lose more, but that in terms 
of head counts or absolute changes, the gains from the winners out-weight 
the losses of the losers. For example, Surinam may well lose 20 percent of 
its human capital and China may gain only 1 percent, but 1 percent of the 
Chinese stock of human capital is way bigger than 20 percent of the 
5  ln is the logarithm of the relative emigration propensity between skilled and non-
skilled immigrants. This is typically used in empirical analyses to get the “elasticity” of a 
variable, that is a 1% change in the explanatory variable leads to a ß% change in the 
dependent variable.
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Surinamese stock of human capital. So while there are loser and winners, 
the brain drain contributes to an increase in the overall number of highly-
skilled people living in the developing world.6
5. COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES: TWO “NATURAL 
EXPERIMENTS”
What about the country case-studies? There are many such studies using 
micro (household or individual) data, notably on countries with very high 
levels of brain drain, such as small Pacific or Caribbean islands. These 
studies have consistently found an overall positive effect of emigration on 
human capital formation, suggesting that even in extreme cases of very 
high brain drain, home countries can still experience a net gain, as if there 
was a special regime for these countries.
I will report here on just two studies which I see as the most convincing 
for the reason that they rely on so-called “natural experiments” which are 
based on specific and arguably random events in a country that acted as 
an exogenous shock to either migration or human capital formation. Those 
shocks will then show their impact on the variables we are interested in 
and alleviate the usual concerns about feedback effect or other 
unobservable convoluting factors that cause “endogeneity” (see footnote 4 
above). 
Let me start with the study on Fiji by Chand and Clemens (2008). The 
story is the following (I apologize for the caricature I am making of Fijian 
past and recent political history). Fiji is a former British Colony initially 
populated by Polynesians (let’s call them native Fijians). During colonial 
times, the British brought many Indian workers to work on the sugar and 
other plantations. Around independence and thereafter, the two 
populations were of similar socio-economic status (income and education 
levels were quite similar) and about equal demographic size. Fijian political 
history became more turbulent in the late 1980s and early 1990s against 
the background of ethnic tensions that culminated in a military coup led 
by native Fijian officers. Following the coup, a discriminatory policy was 
introduced, favoring the native Fijians and putting in place restrictions on 
Indians’ access to universities, public employment, and more. Facing 
violence and discrimination, many Indian Fijians started to contemplate 
emigration. Where to go? Obviously, the two main destinations are 
Australia and New Zealand. However, emigration to those countries is 
6  See Mountford and Rapoport (2011, 2016) for analyses of the brain drain impact on 
the world distribution of income.
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strongly restricted and regulated by a “points-based system” which is 
distorted to favor the highly educated and skilled. Indian Fijians, therefore, 
started to heavily invest in education and in spite of the discrimination 
they faced at home; they shortly overtook the Native Fijians in terms of 
educational attainment. Some did migrate, but some did not, and twenty 
years after the coup, the Indian Fijians living in Fiji enjoy much higher 
human capital and living standards than their “native” compatriots. As 
David Landes would put it: “don’t beat up the little guys!” This is a perfect 
illustration, in my view, of the “option value” argument we put forward in 
Katz and Rapoport (2005).  We argue that the “option value”, that is the 
economic returns to attaining education, increases when political and 
macroeconomic instability is high in the source country. Why? Because 
attaining education provides you with the opportunity to emigrate. In 
other words, education allows you to diversify your income risk by simply 
moving abroad where there is less uncertainty. So if there is an economic 
or political shock at home, education will allow you to be less affected by 
that and thus seems more attractive than in an environment that is overall 
stable. 
The second micro study is from Nepal (Shreshta 2016). Again, I will 
caricature the complex history of Nepal in order to make the intuitive ar-
gument. Nepal is populated by ethnic groups that are close to either Tibetans 
or to Indians, and some other remote groups such as the Gurkas constitute a 
local minority. Such minority groups became enrolled on the side of the 
colonial power, England, in the course of the 19th century, culminating 
with the enrolment of Gurka men in the British Army. For more than a 
century, young Gurka men have been raised and trained to pass the very 
stringent tests required to join the British Army, bringing their families 
pride and income (the salary of a British soldier is about 100 times higher 
than rural wages in Nepal). Still, the Gurkas remained one of the most 
disadvantaged ethnic groups in Nepal in terms of education and income. 
In the early 1990s, the British Army introduced literacy and numeracy tests 
for its new recruits all over the world, and required the completion of mid-
dle-schooling. All of a sudden, being physically and mentally fit was not 
enough. Guess what happened? The Gurkas started to send their kids not 
just to physical training but also to school and collectively invested in the 
hiring of teachers and in schooling infrastructures. Even girls started to go 
to school thanks to economies of scale and peer effects. But only 1 percent 
of the candidates pass the test, and so the Gurkas who don’t go to the army 
end up applying their human capital in other domains, such as agriculture. 
Today, the Gurka group has attained a higher than average level of educa-
tion in Nepal, a catching-up process fully attributable to the change in the 
recruitment rules of the British Army.
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I like this story because I see it as fully exemplifying the insights from 
the beneficial brain drain theory: international migration is characterized 
by small chances to succeed (in emigrating) and high stakes in case of 
success (high wage differentials). In this context more people will invest, 
or some people will invest more in education to increase their chances of 
emigration and of enjoying the higher wages and better amenities (for the 
most part) abroad. For those who remain, the investment made may have 
turned out unprofitable to them, but it is still socially beneficial and can 
even turn out individually beneficial due to externalities. Emigration 
prospects play the role, here, of an education subsidy (to the extent that 
educational attainment is not credit constrained), bringing private 
investment in education closer to its socially optimal level (as social returns 
to education are higher than private returns). Based on the above, it is 
doubtful that Ethiopia or Ghana would end up with more doctors and 
nurses if these were banned from emigrating, or whether the Philippines 
would have some of the best and popular nursing schools, and India some 
of the best and popular engineering schools of the developing world, if 
their graduates were banned or discouraged (through taxation or through 
a mercantilist rhetoric portraying them as traitors) from joyfully selling 
themselves to Western exploiters. 
6. SKILLED DIASPORA NETWORKS
The above-described “incentive” effect takes place before migration 
occurs; once migrants have left, however, they can still affect economic, 
political, and social outcomes in their home country. By sending money or 
returning after some time7 or by forming diaspora networks that serve as 
bridges between host and home countries. Along those bridges, many 
things can circulate: goods, investments, technologies, ideas, and values, 
to mention a few. This is the last strand of brain drain research I want to 
emphasize before concluding. Indeed, being able to draw on a network of 
skilled compatriots scattered around the world (especially if they live in 
the leading countries in terms of technological innovation, financial 
power, and democratic standards) is crucial to many developing and 
emerging countries in their search for better integration into the global 
economy.
There is growing evidence and understanding that migrants in general, 
and skilled migrants in particular, favor the economic, financial, and even 
political and cultural integration of their home country into the global 
economy. The recent literature has consistently shown this, starting from 
7  On brain drain and remittances, see Bollard et al. (2011) and Docquier et al. (2012).
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the “trade creating” effect of migration (Parsons & Vezina forthcoming; 
Felbermayr and Jung 2009) and ending with the uncovering of “social 
remittances” (Levitt and Lamba Nieves 2011) in the realms of demography 
or politics).
Two forces are at play. First, an “information channel”, whereby 
migrants reduce transaction costs between their host and home countries, 
allowing more trade flows (both imports and exports) and inflows of 
Foreign Direct Investments as well as other forms of financial investments 
(e.g., international bank loans, purchase of home-country bonds, etc.). 
While for trade, there is no substantial difference between low- and high-
skill migrants in terms of their ability to convey the relevant transaction-
facilitating information, for financial flows in general, and for FDI in 
particular, skilled migrants seems to have a significant advantage.8
And second, a “knowledge diffusion channel”, whereby migrants 
transfer knowledge, including technological knowledge, but also social 
norms, preferences and values (e.g. preferences for lower fertility or for 
democracy), from the host to the home economy. It is not clear whether 
high- or low-skill migrants have an advantage in initiating such transfers, 
except for innovation adoption and diffusion, where, quite obviously, there 
is a strong advantage for the former.9
7. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the recent economic literature does not support the 
traditional and still very popular view that the brain drain is an impediment 
to developing countries’ current and future economic performance. To the 
contrary, the possibility for people to “sell” their human capital abroad 
generates incentives to invest more in human capital, and a demand for 
higher quality, more internationally transferrable education, which 
ultimately also benefits those who do not emigrate. There are also 
counteracting forces of course: the depletion effect of emigration, the lack 
of incentives if people are credit-constrained, and some diversion in terms 
of fields of study away from the home countries’ needs (e.g., geriatrics 
8  On trade, see Gould (1994), Rauch and Trindade (2002) on the role of ethnic 
Chinese networks and, more recently, Parsons and Vezina (forthcoming), who exploit the 
natural experiment of the Vietnamese boat people of the second half of the 1970s to identify 
the effect of migration networks using US States —Vietnam trade data. On FDI, see notably 
Kugler and Rapoport (2007), and Kugler et al. (2013) on financial flows.
9  On technological knowledge diffusion see Kerr (2008), Agrawal et al. (2011) and 
Bahar and Rapoport (forthcoming). On political remittances, Spilimbergo (2009), Docquier 
et al. (2016) and Barsbai et al. (2016). On “Malthusian” remittances, see Fargues (2007), 
Beine et al. (2013), Bertoli and Marchetta (2015) and Daudin et al. (2016).
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instead of pediatrics). And the benefits from skilled diasporas, which 
appear to be considerable and multi-dimensional, should not be 
overlooked. So even if one adopts a consequentialist view that focuses 
exclusively on the effects of migration on the source countries, disregarding 
people’s rights to emigrate and giving little weight to the migrants 
themselves, the evidence does not support what I would call the now 
outdated mercantilist view of the brain drain. 
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